

Five Staffing Excerpts—Continued

(Continued)

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Transmitted to the Staff Excerpts of the Staff Excerpts.

TOP SECRET

EXHIBIT B TO ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
TOP SECRET TRANSCRIPT

From: Tokyo (Toyoda).
To: Honolulu.
September 24, 1941.
J-19.
#83.

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible.

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objection to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

- Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
- Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
- Area C. East Loch.
- Area D. Middle Loch.
- Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

23260 Trans. 10-9-41 (S)

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

October 14, 1941.

Purple.

#943 (Part 1 of 2)* (To be handled in Government Code).

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

ARMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

* For part 2 see S. I. S. #23516.

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

October 14, 1941.

Purple.

#943 (Part 2 of 2).*

He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany offer Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace and England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand, HOOVER and his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, this whole fray would end with unimaginable quickness. CASTLE^b told me that HUGH GIBSON feels the same way and that Japan, too, should be on the alert for this possibility. This, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by the Isolationists. MOORE^c reports that Secretary HULL told Senator THOMAS that he is proceeding patiently with the Japanese-American negotiations, but he hopes that Japan will not mistake this for a sign of weakness on America's part, and that no answer had arrived to the memo of October 2nd. KIPLINGER^d reports that there is a very good basis for rumors of a cessation of hostilities between Russia and Germany and that the chances for war between Japan and the United States are fifty-fifty.

ARMY 5854 23516 SECRET Trans. 10-15-41 (7)

* Part 1 of 2 not available.

^b Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan.

^c American legal advisor to Japanese Embassy in Washington.

^d A Washington newspaper correspondent.

From: Tokyo (Toyoda).

To: Washington.

October 18, 1941.

Purple (CA).

#671.

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United

States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do something in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power Alliance she had concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in such words as are given in my separate wire and as would not affect the Japanese-American negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me and you.

(Separate wire)

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.

ARMY 5901 23631 SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

October 22, 1941.

Purple. (CA).

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among conferees here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

ARMY 6017 23859 SECRET Trans. 10-23-41 (7)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

5 November 1941.

(Purple-CA).

#736.

(Of utmost secrecy)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1: 6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo.
To: Hongkong.
November 14, 1941.
Purple.

Cir. #2319 (To be handled in Government Code).
(Strictly secret outside the Department)

Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan-American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

- a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.
- b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.
- c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary.

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability to lighten our personal and material load, we will encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far East. At the same time, we place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas). In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity, in a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in force (after you have duly realized the critical situation which has brought the above decisions into being you will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying them out).

In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing legislation. We are wiring you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.

This message is direct to Nanso,* Hokudai,* Shanghai, Tientsin, Hsinkow, Hankow, Canton, and Hongkong. Hokudai* will transmit to Kalgan and Taiyuan. Tsingtao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amoy.

25322
JD 6801 Trans. 11/26/41 (NR)

* Kana spelling.

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
15 November 1941
(J-19)
#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

SIS 25644
JD-1: 6991 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 16, 1941.
Purple (Ca) (Urgent).
#

For your Honor's own information

1. I have read your #1090,* and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.
2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to

the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.^b Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,^c and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

ARMY 24878 JD-1: 6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

^a See JD-:6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.

^b S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

^c S. I. S. #24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,^a and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 25773 7063 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S)

^a Probably means Mamala Bay.

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219^a on that day.

Area A^b—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D^d.

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to _____.

ARMY 25817 7111 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

^a Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.

^b Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

^c East Loch.

^d Middle Loch.

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

19 November 1941.

(J19).

Circular #2353.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:

HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:

KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

(3) Japan-British relations:

NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

(Voice broadcasts.)

SIS 25432

JD-1:6875 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-28-41

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

19 November 1941.

(J19).

Circular #2354.

When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general *intelligence* broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations "HIGASHI"

(2) Japan Russia relations "KITA"

(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) "NISHI"

The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.

SIS 25392

JD-1: 6850 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-26-41

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

19 November 1941.

(Purple-CA).

#798.

Re my #797*

The condition outlined by them namely "After the peaceful policies of Japan have been made more definite" we imagine would naturally have reference to the question of the three-power treaty. It does not mean merely that Japan will withdraw her troops from Southern Indo-China, and that then the U. S. will go back to conditions prior to the freezing act. It leaves the way open for the U. S. to bring up rather complicated terms.

On the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that it would be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored. It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that would come up to the B** proposal. With the situation as urgent as it is now, it is of utmost importance that you play your hand for the amelioration of the situation, to the extent of the proposal in your message, then to push on for an understanding.

The Ambassador did not arrange this with us beforehand, but made the proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting the tense situation existing within the nation, but this can only result in delay and failure in the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore, having received our revised instructions, (after reading our #797*, #800*** and #801****) will please present our B** proposal of the Imperial Government, and no further concessions can be made.

If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best efforts.

We note what you say in your #1133***** and #1134*****, but in these negotiations consent can be given only within the scope of the instructions of this office. We would emphasize this.

S. I. S. #25040

JD-1: 6658 (F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6657.

**JD-1: 6250, with additional paragraphs 5, 6, 7 in JD-1: 6528.

***JD-1: 6660.

****JD-1: 6661.

*****Not yet available

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 November 22, 1941.
 Purple CA (Urgent).
 #812.

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736*. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

- ARMY 6710 25138 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

* See J. D. #6254. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple.

#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>English</i>
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai (Three-Power Treaty question)	Nyuu Yooku (New York)
Musabetsu Taigun Mondai (The question of non-discriminatory treatment)	Shikago (Chicago)
Shina Mondai (The China question)	Sanfuranshisuko (San Francisco)
Soori (Premier)	Ito Kun (Mr. Ito)
Gaimudaijin (Foreign Minister)	Date Kun (Mr. Date)
Rikugun (The Army)	Tokugawa Kun (Mr. Tokugawa)
Kaigun (The Navy)	Maeda Kun (Mr. Maeda)
Nichi-bei kooshoo (Japan-American negotiations)	Endan (Marriage proposal)
Daitooryoo (President)	Kimiko San (Miss Kimiko)
Haru (Hull)	Fumeko San (Miss Fumeko)
Kokunaijoosei (Internal situation)	Shoobai (Trade)
Jooho Suru (To yield)	Yama Wo Uru (To sell the mountain)
Jooho Sezu (Not to yield)	Yama Wo Urenu (Not to sell the mountain)
Kelsel Kyunten Suru (Situation taking critical turn)	Kodomo Gaumareru (The child is born)

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO: Setagaya 4617.
 Section Chief KASE: Yotsuya 4793.
 The Minister's residence: Ginza 3614.
 The Vice-Minister's residence: Ginza 1022.
 ARMY 6841 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple. (Extremely urgent).
 #1180 (Part 1 of 2).

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

ARMY 6891 25435 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple. (Extremely urgent).
 #1180 (Part 2 of 2).

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

From: Washington (Nomura).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple. (Extremely urgent).
 #1190 (Part 2 of 2).

To be handled in Government Code.

The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility

for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Timi are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that there are considerations of convenience having to do with my interview with the President, should there be anything that you would want me to say at that time, please wire me back at once.

25480 Trans. 11-29-41 (1)

* S. I. S. #25444. (Part 1 of 2.)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

26 November 1941 (1946 to 1953 EST). (Telephone Code)**
Trans-Pacific Telephone.

To Kumaicho Yamamoto* from Kurusu:

Kurusu: "I have made all efforts, but they *will not yield****. I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already," he interrupted himself, "you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how things will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems."

Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: "If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable."

Yamamoto: "The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also." After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: "The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult."

Kurusu: "I believe it is of no avail".

Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.

Kurusu: "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome."

Yamamoto: "Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished."

Kurusu: "I am unable to make any movement (i. e. progress ?) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation."

JD-1: 6843 (M) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (12-TT)

*Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.

**See JD-1: 6841 (S. I. S. #25344), of this date.

***Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The interceptor read this as "Sore . . . kesa" (that . . . this morning) and translated this as "It is now . . .", with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to him. Verification will follow receipt of record.

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

November 28, 1941.

Purple. (CA).

#844.

Re your #1189.*

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This

is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180^b and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #25441, #25442.

^b S. I. S. #25435, #25436. The man is the Navy Minister.

From: Tokyo.
To: Honolulu.
29 November 1941.
(J19).
#122.

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

SIS 25823

JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
29 November 1941.
(Purple-CA).
#857.

Re my #844*

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

SIS 25496

JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be "de facto" ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST).
Telephone Code.

Transpacific Radio Telephone (NOTE.—Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night).

KURUSU. "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about

the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

YAMAMOTO. "Yes. I see."

KURUSU. "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y. "Is there any special significance to this?"

K. "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y. "Is that so?"

K. "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving."

(Pause.)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y. "We are being careful."

K. "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. Premier's speech.)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.)

K. "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan.)

Y. "No particular—one or two words faded out—"

K. "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y. "yes."

K. "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches!!!! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."

Y. "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K. "Let's see . . . this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause.)

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of the happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

Y. "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K. "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y. "Well then—Goodbye."

JD-1: 6922 (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)

25497

From: Tokyo.

To: Berlin.

November 30, 1941.

Purple. (CA).

#985 (Part 1 of 3).^a

Re my Circular #2387.^b

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986.) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

25552

JD 6943 Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

^a Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S. I. S. #25553.

^b Not available.

^c See S. I. S. #25554 and 25555.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Berlin.
 November 30, 1941.
 Purple. (CA).
 #985 (Part 3 of 3).

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.

25553 Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Berlin.
 November 30, 1941.
 Purple.

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code (Part 1 of 2)
 (Secret outside the Department)).

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with our message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested, (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East, that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

ARMY 6944 25554 SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)

From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
Purple.
#986 (Part 2 of 2).

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they do so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, an enemy.

ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941.
(Purple).
#1227.

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

25727

JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

3248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
1 December 1941.
(Purple).
Circular #2436.

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attaché's office there and make use of chemicals they have on hand for this purpose. The attaché should have been advised by the Navy Ministry regarding this.

25545

JD-1: 6939 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo.
To: London.
1 December 1941.
(Purple).
Circular #2443.

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately. In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very careful to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.

As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word SETUJU in plain language and as soon as you have carried out the instructions wire the one word HASSO in plain language.

Also at this time you will of course burn the machine codes and the YU GO No. 26 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England.)

25787

JD-1: 7091 (H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (L)

From: Tokyo.
To: Hsinking.
1 December 1941.
(Purple).
#893.

-----In the event that Manchuria participates in the war-----
in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR)

SIS 2583

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
1 December 1941.
(Purple-CA).
#865.

Re my #857*.

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

SIS-25605

JD-1:1 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6921.

**JD-1: 6716.

***Not available.

COMPLETED TRANSLATION

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.
Purple.

#1232 (Part 1 of 2).

Re my #1231.

Today, the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instructions of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233*. Thereupon we said: "Since haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th. The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

25659-B

* Not available.

* Original translation incomplete from this point on. Trans 12/3/41

From: Washington, (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.
Purple.
#1232 (Part 2 of 2).

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued:

"We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here."

Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1244*.

25660 Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

ARMY

* Not available.

(CORRECTED TRANSLATIONS)

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Washington.

December 2, 1941.

Purple.

#867. (Strictly Secret).

1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code (Oite) and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)

2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.

3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna".

4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.

5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic official KOSAKA brought you. (Hence, the necessity of getting in contact with Mexico mentioned in my #860* is no longer recognized.)

#25640 Translated 12-3-41 (X) Corrected 12-4-41.

* S. I. S. #25550 in which Tokyo wires Washington advising them to have KOSAKA return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru which sails on the 28th. If this makes it impossible for KOSAKA to make his trip to Mexico, make some other arrangements with regard to KOSAKA's business in Mexico.

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

December 2, 1941.

J-19.

#123 (Secret outside the department).

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

NOTE.—This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 8007 27065 SECRET (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

3 December 1941.

(Purple).

#1223.

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

25785

JD-1: 7098 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

From: Berlin.

To: Tokyo.

December 4, 1941.

Purple. (CA).

#1410.

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

ARMY 25807 JD-7134 Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

5 December 1941.

(Purple).

#1268.

Re your #867*

From Councillor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communication Section:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

25836

JD-1: 7136 (M) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

* (Dated 2 December) JD-1: 7017 (SIS #25640): Directs Washington to destroy all copies of codes except one copy of certain ones, and also destroy one code machine.

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

Purple

#901

Re my #844*.

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

ARMY 7149 25838 SECRET Trans 12/6/41 (S)

* See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 December 6, 1941.
 Purple (Urgent).
 #1272.

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President in his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us——(MESSAGE INCOMPLETE)——.

ARMY 25846 7176 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2T)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 Purple
 #902 (Part 1 of 14)
 Separate telegram
 MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 Purple
 #902 (Part 2 of 14).

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours towards the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of

French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

Purple

#902 (Part 3 of 14).

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

Purple

#902 (Part 4 of 14).

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 Purple.
 #902 (Part 5 of 14).

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

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From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 Purple.
 #902 (Part 6 of 14).

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 4, 1941.
 Purple.
 #902 (Part 7 of 14).

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

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From: Tokyo.
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Purple.
#902 (Part 8 of 14).

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
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Purple.
#902 (Part 9 of 14).

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1 : 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902 (Part 10 of 14).

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one country—(45 letters garbled or missing)—been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the —es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 Purple.

#902 (Part 11 of 14).

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n—(50 letters missed)—sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 Purple.

#902 (Part 12 of 14).

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 Purple.

#902 (Part 13 of 14).

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT*** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD:1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

*Probably "and as."

**Probably "China, can but."

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 7 December 1941.
 (Purple-Eng).
 #902 Part 14 of 14.

(NOTE. In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Honolulu.
 December 6, 1941.
 PA-K2.
 #128.

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123^a the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

(Japanese)

ARMY 7381 26158 SECRET Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

^a Not available.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 7, 1941.
 Purple (Urgent—Very Important).
 #907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902.^a

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

^a JD-1: 7143—text of Japanese reply.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 7, 1941.
 Purple (Extremely Urgent).
 #910.

After deciphering part 14 of my #902^a and also #907^b, #908^c and #909^d, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner all secret documents.

25854 Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

- ^a S. I. S. #25843—text of reply.
^b S. I. S. #25850.
^c S. I. S. #25853.
^d S. I. S. #25858.

From: Budapest.
To: Tokyo.
December 7, 1941.
L.A.
#104.

Re my #103*.

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

ARMY 25866 7184 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

* Relayed to Berlin.

NOTE.—The Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board is printed as a part of Joint Committee Exhibit No. 157. Appendix No. 1 is printed following the Report.)